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INTRODUCTION
In family law, as in many areas of law, the relationship between the rules
devised to govern an individual’s behavior and the actual lived experiences
of these same individuals is rarely, if ever, simple or straightforward. This
symposium provides yet another example of this complicated relationship.
It aims to explore the lingering remnants of “illegitimacy”—revisiting why
parentage and parental status should not depend on marital status—utilizing
a fairly simple and straightforward deductive argument1 that would, if the
*
Associate Professor of Law and Director of Research Civitas ChildLaw Center,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. My sincere thanks to Professor Nancy
Polikoff for the invitation to participate in the American University Washington
College of Law conference, “The New ‘Illegitimacy’: Revisiting Why Parentage
Should Not Depend on Marriage,” and for all of her pioneering work aimed at
validating and affirming the equal worth and dignity of all families. My thanks as well
to the other participants of the conference for their useful comments and critique.
1. Two caveats: I am neither a philosopher nor a traditional family law scholar
and delve into both domains in this Article with great caution. However, in grafting
my work on kinship caregiving families onto the broader plane of family law writ
large, I find the framework of deductive reasoning useful. I believe that deductive
arguments allow for the observation of inconsistencies that should otherwise not exist
given the truth of the premises upon which conclusions are based. For example, if the
stigma of illegitimacy has been effectively eliminated under the law, then the continued
emphasis on the marital status of adults for the purposes of protecting their
relationships with children seems logically out of place. This should arguably hold true
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relationship were as simple and straightforward as proposed, guarantee the
truth of the conclusion that children are not penalized based upon their
parents’ marital status:
1. It is unconstitutional to penalize a child born to unmarried parents
on the basis of his/her parents’ non-marital status.2
2. Failure to legally protect a child’s significant attachment
relationship to an unmarried parent is a penalty.3
3. Accordingly, a child born to unmarried parents is unconstitutionally
penalized when his or her primary attachment relationship to an
unmarried parent is not legally protected.
As simple and straightforward as the conclusion should be, based on the
truth of the premises that precede it, it is not. Indeed, as we learn from the
work of Solangel Maldonado, children continue to suffer legal and social
disadvantages, including discrimination under the law as well as social
stigma, as a result of their parents’ marital status.4
This Article, which specifically addresses the continued role of
illegitimacy—as in de-legitimized, fraudulent, counterfeit or makeshift—in
the context of relative caregiving, presents a normative thought experiment
reliant upon a slight variation of the above deductive argument:
1. If illegitimacy distinctions are unconstitutional, eligibility for legal
parental or co-parental status should not depend upon the presence
or absence of a marital tie between, or a marital tie to, a biological
parent.
2. Relative caregivers cannot establish a marital tie to a biological
parent.
3. Therefore, relative caregivers’ eligibility for parental or co-parental
status should not necessarily depend upon the presence or absence
of a marital tie to a biological parent.5
for kinship caregiving families as much as “traditional” families typically contemplated
in discussions about illegitimacy. In the most simplistic sense, deductive arguments
are attempts to show that a conclusion necessarily follows from a set of premises. An
example of deductive reasoning is: (1) all men are mortal; (2) Socrates is a man;
therefore, (3) Socrates is mortal.
2. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391-94 (1979) (rejecting the
distinction between married and unmarried parents because maternal and paternal roles
are of equal importance).
3. See Weber v. Aetna, 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (finding that children can
form significant attachments to unmarried parents and could suffer from legal
distinctions between married and unmarried parents).
4. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 345 (2011).
5. Of course, while eligibility of relative caregivers for parental status can
arguably depend on other factors, the focus of this Article is to explore how the role
that marital status or eligibility to enter into marriage/sexual union functions to
disqualify relative caregivers from parental status.
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Many questions quite reasonably flow from the syllogism above. Chief
among them is whether the ascription of parental or co-parental status to
relative caregivers is in competition with, or in conjunction with, that
accorded to biological parents? Essentially, would the deductive argument
asserted above support granting parental status to a relative caregiver in
addition to two biological parents, married or not, thus creating a multiple
parentage scenario? I have elsewhere broached the topic of multiple
parentage,6 and leave to my colleagues who write significantly more on the
multiple parentage question the opportunity to address this issue in richer
detail and depth. Multiple parentage, while, in many instances, a natural
conclusion that can be drawn from my argument, is neither the primary
focus of this symposium nor this particular thought experiment. Rather, the
question this thought experiment is intended to provoke is one concerning
“relatedness” and, at the risk of appearing hopelessly sentimental, “love.”
Moreover, I hope to touch on what—in the context of parentage—
“relatedness” and “love” have to do with the best interests of children. The
aim of this Article, consistent with the theme of this symposium, is to call
into question the paradigmatic ways in which “intimate dyadism,” or eros,
continues to define the boundaries of parentage and parental status—
challenging the ways in which a particular form of relatedness through
marriage continues to define the boundary between legitimate and
illegitimate. In advancing an understanding of parental status and
parentage that better comports with the experiences and needs of children, I
also aim to explore how agape parentage can work in the best interests of
children, particularly those being raised in relative-caregiver households.
I. BACKGROUND
To start, it is worth exploring why it is that some strenuously resist the
reasoning presented in the second deductive construct regarding relative
caregivers as parents or co-parents. Although courts and legislative bodies
are increasingly extending standing to non-biological parents as either de
facto parents, parents by estoppel, or some derivation thereof,7 there is a
strain of thought or justification in almost all of these cases that premises
quasi-parental status upon the notion of “partner-hood” or “coupling”—
with competing parental claims from parties who function as either an
intact or, more likely, former romantically linked couple. The most recent
ruling on this matter by the Delaware Supreme Court, Smith v. Guest,8
6. See, e.g., Sacha M. Coupet, Ain’t I a Parent?: The Exclusion of Kinship
Caregivers from the Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 595 (2010).
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (2011); In re Parentage of L.B., 122
P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
8. Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920 (Del. 2011).
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serves as a reminder that de facto parent status is premised on a very
particular type of relationship both with the child, and, most importantly,
although not always explicitly noted, with the biological parent.9 In Smith,
the court, distinguishing the claims of Guest, a former romantic partner of a
biological parent, from similar claims of grandparents of a biological parent
in Troxel v. Granville,10 noted that Guest was not just “any third party.”11
Accordingly, the court intimates that grandparents and other relatives with
strong attachment and caregiving relationships to relative minors are the
quintessential “any” third parties on whom the restrictions addressed in
Troxel should lie.12 In contrast, former partners of biological parents are
somehow less different from grandparents and other relatives. Partners of
parents share a different kind of relatedness that, although not identical, is
similar enough in form and function to marriage to qualify this particular
class of third parties as legitimate de facto parents. Although the logical
extension of de facto parent claims should include any person who has
developed a supportive and nurturing relationship with a child sufficiently
profound as to merit protection under the law, to date those claims have
only protected adults who were at some point “partners” of biological
parents in a marital or quasi-marital relationship.13 Indeed, the degree to
which an adult petitioning for parental recognition bears some resemblance
to a married partner, the more likely the claim is to be legally upheld and
the more socially acceptable the ascription of parental status.
Not surprisingly, and consistent with this assertion, last year’s debate
over same-sex marriage in New York state was replete with instances in
which the claims both for and against extending the right to marry to same
sex couples was premised upon the importance of marriage for children.14
Said one author, expressing a view that many believe compelled the New
York legislature to ultimately pass the bill extending marriage to same-sex
couples, “[m]arriage can protect children—legally, financially, socially—
and same-sex marriage will give more parents more ways to protect more
children.”15 The premise of this Article is that were we truly post9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 924-25.
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Smith, 16 A.3d at 931 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 (holding unconstitutional a “non-parent”
visitation statute that allowed third parties to subject a parent’s right-of-visitation
decision to state court review)).
13. See, e.g., C.M.G. v. L.M.S., CIV. No. 94 2331, 4102, 2010 WL 2696112, at
*15 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 23, 2010) (considering the relationship of Guest with the
biological parent in determining de facto parental status).
14. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Let My Parents Marry, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011,
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/let-my-parents-marry/
(providing
several findings and stories on the “effect” of same-sex marriage on children).
15. Amy Davidson, Close Read: Gay Marriage: New York, not North Korea, NEW
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illegitimacy, distinctions between those protections available to children
within marital households and those outside would not exist. And yet they
do.
I suggest that resistance to the syllogism proposed, even among those
who favor decoupling marriage and parenthood, stems from the way in
which the discourse around parental status continues to favor individuals
who are married, capable of marriage, or at least within the ambit of
“prescribed mating”—a class that categorically excludes relative
caregivers. The “New Illegitimacy,” under whose banner this collection of
scholars have united to protest, is particularly pernicious because—
accepting the guarantee of the conclusion in the deductive argument first
presented—we assumed it was axiomatic that children would not suffer on
the basis of the marital status of the persons who assisted in their creation.
However, even if the gains new illegitimacy scholars seek are realized and
children no longer bear any burden or disability related to the marital status
of their progenitor parents, there are still children who will be so burdened
within the broader definition of parent.16 Children being raised or coparented by relative caregivers will still find their significant attachment
relationships unprotected and delegitimized on the basis of the absence of a
marital or quasi-marital tie between the people who are raising them.
II. KINSHIP CAREGIVING
Data on grandparent caregiving suggests that relative co-parenting is not
an isolated phenomenon.17 Indeed, far from a recent phenomenon, an
increasing number of children are currently being “parented” in the homes
of relatives by nonparent caregivers, often alongside and cooperatively
YORKER BLOG, (June 15, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/
closeread/2011/06/gay-marriage-new-york-not-north-korea.html.
16. Indeed, it is a broader definition of parent, parentage, and parental status upon
which my deductive argument is based. The focus of this Article, however, is not to
elaborate upon a justification for broader definition of parenthood, but rather to address
the ways in which even broad definitions of parenthood are narrowly made through the
lens of romantic coupling, thus excluding families who are parenting without such ties.
Indeed, it is well accepted that although “[p]arenthood has traditionally been connected
to marital status, genetics, and legal presumptions, [i]n the past several decades, courts
have been willing to entertain the idea that people who cannot qualify as parents
through these tests might still be entitled to some sort of parental interests.” Linda
Anderson, Just Because You Don’t Want Kids Doesn’t Mean I Can’t Have Them: How
Clarifying Definitions of “Parent” and “Procreate” Can Prevent The Indefinite
Storage of Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 231, 236 (2010); see
also Deborah L. Foreman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third Parties, or Parents?
The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for Parental Equality, 40 FAM. L.Q.
23 (2006).
17. Howard Dubowitz, Children in Kinship Care: How Do They Fare?, 16 CHILD.
& YOUTH SERVS. REV. 85, 85 (1994) (stating that kinship care is a recent trend with
statistics indicating that in some regions approximately half of the children in out-ofhome placements are in kinship care).
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with a legal biological parent.18 These caregivers are disproportionately
persons of color, particularly black men and women.19 I focus on
grandparent caregiving, as opposed to all relative caregiving, as it
represents the majority of relative caregiving situations.20 Keep in mind,
however, that aunts, uncles, siblings are also within the pool of relative
caregivers this Article is meant to address.
The following figures capture the current profile of grandparent
caregiving in the United States as of the most recent census:21
•
•
•
•
•

4.85 million children living with grandparents in grandparents’
home;
Of these, 823,000 live with grandparents and both of their
biological parents;
2.14 million live with grandparents and a biological mother;
236,000 live with grandparents and a biological father; and
1.66 million live with grandparents without any biological
parent in the home (so called “skipped generation” households
as compared with “three generation” households noted above)

Solely to put these numbers in context, and to drive home the point that
we are not talking about an obscure and insignificant population, it might
help to compare the above figures to a population roughly similar in size.
Compare, for example, the 2.14 million children residing in grandparent
and bio parent households—perhaps in some form of co-parenting
relationship—with a comparably sized population that generates much well
deserved attention regarding rights, responsibilities and well-being;
prisoners incarcerated in the United States. As of June 2009, there were
approximately 2.3 million persons incarcerated in both federal and state
prisons and jails throughout the United States.22 Compare, as well, the 1.66
million children residing only with grandparent caregivers23 with the 1.3
million persons incarcerated in state prisons across the United States as of
18. See Jennifer Ehrle et al., Kinship Foster Care: Custody, Hardships, and
Services, Snapshots of America’s Fams. No. 14, Nov. 30, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310893_snapshots3_no14.pdf (stating that many
abused and neglected children are placed with relatives because there are substantial
benefits to placing children with relatives rather than with unrelated foster parents).
19. See Dubowitz, supra note 17, at 87 (indicating that 90% of the 524 children in
kinship care who participated in the study were of African-American descent).
20. See id. (reporting that 47% of the caregivers that participated in the study were
the child’s grandparent).
21. U.S. Census Bureau, America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2010,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2011) (click on Table C.1: Household Relationship and Family Status of
Children Under 18 Years, by Age and Sex: 2010).
22. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, 2 tbl.1 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus09.pdf.
23. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 21, at tbl.C.1.
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2009.24
Kinship caregiving practices are more prevalent in families of color and
other marginalized communities coping with economic, social, and
political pressures.25 Along with the day-to-day burden of caregiving that
inevitably accompanies the role of kinship caregiver, the ambiguity of the
caregiver’s status vis-à-vis the child for whom they are caring is
particularly problematic. Indeed, the ambiguity may arise from differing
perceptions of caregivers and those who ascribe legal roles and grant legal
protections. As the anthropologist Carol B. Stack observed in her seminal
1974 piece, “All Our Kin,” concerning the informal rules governing
intergenerational rights over, and responsibilities to, children—essentially,
parental status—within a poor black community, there is a complex web of
informal rights and duties not to be confused with the formal, official or
statutory rules that govern such relationships.26
She cautioned,
“Community members clearly operate within two different systems: the
folk system and the legal system of the courts and welfare offices.”27 She
asserted that what was particularly wounding was when the legal system
failed to recognize the folk system as it was not just the denial of muchneeded support, but also the message that these kinship caregiving families
are somehow “illegitimate.”28
So, what place is there in the new illegitimacy discourse for this
population of families? Sadly, to date, not much. I believe, however, that
the discourse on legitimate families could be more comprehensively
enriched by focusing on the following critical questions: in the context of
determining parental status, protecting parent-child relationships, and
ascribing “legitimacy” within the community of families, whose relatedness
matters and what kind of relatedness counts?
III. WHOSE RELATEDNESS MATTERS?
In a system in which the best interest of the child are regarded as
paramount, it should not be at all surprising to answer that query with the
assertion that relatedness to the child matters most. The current “couple24. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 22, at appx. tbl.2.
25. Approximately 6.5% of non-white children live in a household with no parent

present, compared to 3.4% of white children. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 21
(percentage calculated by author). Moreover, 8.2% of children living in a family below
100% of poverty live in a household with no parent present, compared to 2.4% of
children living in a family at 200% of poverty and above. Id. (percentage calculated by
author).
26. CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY 46 (1974).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 89 (finding that intervention by social agencies is interpreted as an
attempt by the “larger society” to control their children).
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centric” focus, however, is primarily on “begetting” adult couples, as if
“begetting” were synonymous with “belonging to” and capable, in and of
itself, of trumping all other forms of relatedness. One problem, among
many, with the focus on begetting is that it conjures property allusions long
disparaged in family law. Indeed, children are no longer the mere chattel
of the progenitors who participate or consent to their creation. So, if legal
recognition of parentage is not procreation driven, then what? A parentchild relational model, by contrast, appeals to those who seek to revisit why
parental status should not depend on marriage, as it emphasizes the quality
of this more significant relationship, over the distracting and peripheral
adult ones. This model is inherently more inclusive because it does not
categorically privilege or exclude adults on the basis of irrelevant criteria,
like adult sexual conduct, and, so doing, opens the door to legal recognition
of quasi-parental figures who play significant roles in the lives of children.
Thankfully, because “parenthood” is a social construct defined by law, it
is highly adaptive and capable of accommodating the various
circumstances in which parental status should run parallel with the
underlying conduct and relationships that give rise to that role. As such,
the construction of parenthood, with all the attendant rights and
responsibilities, should rest upon an understanding of how adults relate to
the child, not necessarily the manner in which they themselves are
intimately connected, whether married or not, for that is an irrelevant
consideration. Indeed, as family law, long critiqued for its reliance upon
property concepts to define parental privileges,29 adopts a more expansive
vision of parenthood that is more functionally and relationally oriented,
there is fertile ground for the claim that the quality of the relationships that
children form with caregiving adults is the sine qua non of parentage.
Challenges to new illegitimacy form a part of that ongoing reform.
IV. WHAT KIND OF RELATEDNESS MATTERS?
Just as the misplaced emphasis on adult-adult relationships over those
that adults form with the children they are raising reifies the primacy of
marriage, inevitably creating a class of legitimate and illegitimate families,
so too does the misplaced emphasis on a specific kind of relatedness or
love. In the Greek language, there are three words that are used to define
the word “love”—eros, philia, and agape.30 The first one, eros, represents
sexual or romantic love;31 from eros comes the word “erotica.” The second
29. See, e.g., RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES 57 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
30. See Alan Soble, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Love, in EROS, AGAPE,
AND PHILA: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE xi, xxii (Alan Soble ed., 1989).
31. See id. at xxiii (noting that Plato’s eros “is the manner in which humans

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/9

8

Coupet: Beyond Eros: Relative Caregiving, Agape Parentage, and the Best I

2012]

BEYOND “EROS”

619

word, philia, generally refers to the non-sexual brotherly love or affection
between friends.32 From this word, we have, for example, Philadelphia,
known as the “City of Brotherly Love” and philanthropy, or love for
humanity. The last word, agape, refers to a type of love that stands in
sharp contrast to that of the other two words, which are primarily motivated
by self-interest, self-gratification, and self-protection.33 Agape, which is
more of a detached, spiritual love points to a completely self-sacrificing
love, a love lacking in self-interest, self-gratification and selfpreservation.34 Agape love, in contrast particularly to eros, is motivated
primarily by the interest and welfare of others.35 Greek philosophers at the
time of Plato and other ancient authors have used forms of the word to
denote love of a spouse, family, or children in contrast to philia, which is
more generally distributed among non-sexual affection, and eros, an
affection inherently defined by sex.36 While agape, and even philia, have
both been used to describe the love between parents and children, the
architecture of parentage itself, and specifically the rules that govern the
ascription of parental status, reflect the centrality of eros.37
If marriage is the engine that drives the discourse on parenthood, sex or
romantic coupling is the fuel that feeds it. Why is this? Parentage’s focus
on adult intimate dyadism—read, eros or sex—can perhaps find an
anthropological and historical basis in heterosexual mating as the only
means of procreation. However, advances in reproductive technology have
rendered heterosexual mating’s primacy nearly obsolete.38 Couples can
avail themselves of a number of reproductive techniques aimed at bringing
a child into the world, none of which actually require an intimate act of
coitus.39 Nonetheless, eros shapes the discourse on parentage, as evident in
the focus placed on the nature of the adult relationship within which
decision-making regarding procreation takes place.
Although
necessarily love”).
32. See Alan Soble, Classical Sources, in EROS, AGAPE, AND PHILA, supra note 30,
at 41, 43-44 (recognizing Aristotle’s philia as “ideal friendship”).
33. See Anders Nygren, Agape And Eros, in EROS, AGAPE, AND PHILA, supra note
30, at 85, 93 (defining agape as “unmotivated”).
34. See id. (describing agape as “unselfish” love).
35. Id.
36. See id. (contrasting the concepts) .
37. See Lynn D. Wardle, All You Need is Love?, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 51, 60 (2004) (noting that courts have recently begun recognizing the parties’
emotions when resolving family law cases).
38. See generally Clinic Summary Report, SOC. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECH.,
https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_PublicMultYear.aspx (last visited Nov. 9,
2011) (providing data about reproductive technologies).
39. See Assisted Reproductive Technologies, SOC. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECH.,
http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=1908 (last visited Nov. 9, 2011) (listing techniques
such as in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer).
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technological advances have moved us beyond heterosexual mating as the
touchstone of parental status, we have not moved beyond eros, looking still
to romantically linked couples as the archetypal parents. The more and
more we move away from “the sex act”—however defined, heterosexual or
homosexual—as a defining feature of bringing a life into being, the less we
ought to be reliant on sex, sexual intimacy or romantic coupling to define
the “parental context.” The conflation of eros and parental status is
particularly evident in debates over same-sex marriage, gay adoption bans,
and expanded definitions of parenthood.40 Same-sex marriage advocates
focus on securing marriage rights as a means of securing parental claims
reifies the notion that only romantically linked couples should form the
core parental unit. Gay adoption bans, for example, that preclude lesbians
and gays from adopting are supposedly justified on the notion that
“deviant” adult sexual conduct has negative repercussions for children
parented by these same gay and lesbian couples.41 Even expanded
definitions of parenthood limit such expansion to couples in relationships
that bear a strong resemblance to marriage.
I am compelled to give a nod, albeit briefly, to concerns about
practicality, particularly multiple parentage claims, as these concerns are
typically among those I hear in response to my proposal advancing the
parental claims of relative caregivers. I, and a growing number of family
law scholars, do not doubt the capacity of the law to accommodate the
claims of two, or three, or more legal parents, among whom rights and
responsibilities are divided in a manner reflective of the ways in which
ongoing care is delivered and significant relationships are formed.42 Many
families have already been organizing themselves in this way—by virtue of
their “family-ness,” rather than their “married-ness”—they are no less
deserving of legal protection.
CONCLUSION
Framing the new illegitimacy debate as solely about marriage, or the

40. But see Lisa Belkin, An End to Gay-Adoption Bans?, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2010,
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/an-end-to-gay-adoption-bans/
(noting that it is the quality of parenting and not the sexual orientation of the parents
that raises a healthy child).
41. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Fla. Asserts Unstable Gay Homes Justify Adoption
Ban, A.B.A. J., Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
fla._asserts_unstable_gay_homes_justify_adoption_ban (reporting an assertion by a
Florida lawyer that homosexual couples have higher rates of domestic violence,
psychiatric disorders, and breakups).
42. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347 (2012) (discussing that the choices the law makes
about parentage are policy decisions and can shape the understanding of family through
acknowledging connections).
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lack thereof, limits the scope of creative options for parentage law reform
to the exclusion of many meritorious parental claims. In keeping the focus
on the presence or absence of marriage, the discourse is already profoundly
shaped by marital referents. To the degree that the debate continues to
revolve around marriage, those for whom it has no currency will remain
irrelevant, or illegitimate, so to speak. That said, perhaps my proposal is
premature. Perhaps the “new illegitimacy” struggle is one that should be
marked instead by the incremental dismantling of traditional norms.
However, in the attempt to decouple marriage from parenthood, should
progressive family law scholars not critically reexamine the ways in which
we continue to blindly frame the parenthood discourse with referents that
resonate with marital themes? To the degree that the current discourse on
parenthood retains remnants of the marital procreative unit, should
progressive family law scholars not object? Until we dispense with the
myopic focus on the nature of adult partnerships—or at least relegate it one
of many relevant factors that can be considered in determining parental
status—we will continue to circumscribe parenthood to only those parties
we could conceivably regard as married or “married-like.” Until we cease
to rely on the master’s tools in conceptualizing parenthood—valuing other
forms of relatedness and love, other than romantic love—our resistance to
the new illegitimacy will be marked by only limited gains, permitting only
the narrowest measures of change.43

43. Feminist thinker, Audre Lorde, originated the phrase “using the master’s tools.”
Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in SISTER
OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110-13 (1984). The term is meant to suggest that
when we use the “master’s tools” (i.e., the tools of a dominant oppressive norm), we
reify its authority and its ability to determine which tools are effective in the act of
resistance. Each act of “dismantling,” while meant to be an act of resistance, therefore
rebuilds the dominant power.
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